Cryptocurrencies are expected to have a significant impact on banking, finance, and monetary systems. Due to uncertainty as to the possible future trajectories of the evolving cryptocurrency ecosystem, governments have taken a relatively hands-off approach to regulating such currencies. This approach may be justified within the theoretical information-economics framework of this paper, which draws parallels between the information economics of money and quasi-money creation within the current central banking, commercial banking and shadow banking systems with that of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. In particular, drawing lessons from the literature on the role of information in creating 'safe assets', this paper finds that by building on symmetric (common) knowledge as to the inner workings of the Bitcoin Blockchain -though in a different way -bitcoin possesses a degree of endogenous information insensitivity typical of safe assets.
Introduction
Decentralized, permissionless and blockchain-based cryptocurrencies 1 and their underlying technology are said to have as transformative an impact on value as the invention of the internet had on information. 2 The
Bitcoin Blockchain or its so-called distributed 'trust machine' 3 has eventually solved the age-old doublespending problem, which for decades hampered the advent of digital money for the internet. Prior to bitcoin (BTC), even outside the virtual space, addressing double-spending problem was delegated to trusted third parties with centralized ledgers, who used to verify and confirm financial transactions. Bitcoin solved this problem in a secure, decentralized, consensus-based and censorship-resistant manner, without relying on third parties. The proof of work (PoW) 4 used in the Bitcoin Blockchain, despite being energy intensive, appears to be a secure technique which provides a decentralized and incentive-compatible mechanism for verifying and confirming transactions, as well as securing the Bitcoin Blockchain. 5 Although solving the double-spending problem has been a significant step forward in introducing bitcoin as a potential medium of exchange, the more challenging problem proved to be its universal acceptance. 6 As Minsky puts:
"everyone can create money; the problem is to get it accepted". 7 As of this writing, the problem of price volatility has been a barrier discouraging universal adoption and has prevented bitcoin from becoming a reliable store of value or a potential unit of account. ; 4 The price volatility of bitcoin, as part of a premature asset class, should not come as a surprise. Perhaps the most difficult case to be made for bitcoin as a currency is the unit-of-account aspect of moneyness. As a commodity with a fixed supply schedule, the bitcoin would remain volatile for the foreseeable future in response to the demand shocks. Nonetheless, as will be shown in this paper, bitcoin price volatility has had a decreasing tend. 5 The proof of work in principle discourages 51% attack on the network, because to hack the network, the hacker should accumulate substantial amounts of the coins. Having accumulated the coins and invested in the mining infrastructure, the hacker would not have the economic incentive to hack the system anymore. See: Josh Stark, "Making Sense of Cryptoeconomics," in Coindesk (August 19, 2017 14-17 (2014) . 7 Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986; repr., 2008), 255. 8 For the unit-of-account purposes, the authors do not believe that the current decimal numbers can be a real bottleneck for bitcoin as it can be solved redefining the default standard for measuring bitcoin. Currently, there is one promising Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) for bits submitted by Jimmy Song in December 2017. It is a proposal to record BTC in 'bits', every bit having a corresponding value of one thousandth of a bitcoin (i.e., 1 bit = 100 satoshis). This proposal is known as Bits Denomination BIP. See: Jimmy Song, "Bits Denomination Bip," GitHub, https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0176.mediawiki.
At the time of this writing, the Bitcoin Blockchain is the most decentralized network in terms of its mining pools. Other cryptocurrencies display higher concentration levels. As the concentration increases, the likelihood of collusion and 51% attack among major participants increase, posing security threats to the underlying blockchain. The increased concentration also increases the probability of being taken under central control (of governments or non-governmental entities), eventually leading to the loss of censorshipresistance feature and even being shut down. Although game-theoretic and economic incentives embedded in the bitcoin network harshly punish misbehaving, such incentive mechanisms do not entirely eliminate such a probability. 21 There has been proposals to make bitcoin mining pools more decentralized, however, as of this writing, none has been implemented.
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In this paper, after a discussion on the nature of money and cryptocurrencies, we will focus on the concept of money and building upon the literature on information-economics of debt contracts and safe assets, we will argue that bitcoin can potentially be viewed as a 'safe assets' from this information-economics perspective. Although bitcoin aims at offering the functions of base money or central bank high-powered money 23 and as such cannot be directly compared to the commercial bank money (i.e., bank-issued IOUs)
or shadow bank money, money creation in banking and shadow banking is discussed as it is necessary for understanding the creation of information-insensitivity in the process of (private or public-private) money creation. Our main contribution lies in the insights gained from the information economics in the context of 'safe assets' and money and quasi-money creation within the shadow banking sector and their application to the cryptocurrency context. In particular, drawing lessons from the literature on 'safe assets' and building on Holmstrom's seminal work (2015) , 24 this paper highlights certain differences in the basic information economics of cryptocurrencies as opposed to that of fiat currencies (including the monetary aggregates) that can inform policy discussions about the future regulation of cryptocurrencies.
It is noteworthy at this very outset that informational advantage is not the only parameter that can play a role in transforming an asset into a money-like asset or a means of payment and settlement. There are other, and more important considerations in transforming an asset into money or quasi-money, such as price stability, lower intermediation costs, universal acceptance, technical neutrality (i.e., neutrality towards the type or value of the underlying transaction), instant and immediate settlement of the underlying fiduciary obligations and, last but not least, legal tender status and legal protections offered to the means of payments 21 See: Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System."; Stark, "Making Sense of Cryptoeconomics." 22 See: Eyal and Sirer, "How to Disincentivize Large Bitcoin Mining Pools." 23 Base money or high-powered money is the money issued by central banks and in most economies consists of coins and (central bank) notes. 24 Bengt Holmstrom, "Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System," BIS Working Paper No 479 (2015) .
and settlements such as ensuring settlement finality, protection from fraud, counterfeiting, and misuse. 25 For example, in addition to the information insensitivity, moneyness requires scarcity. There are many information insensitive objects that can become money merely because of their simple informational structure (e.g., a grain of sand), however, since their supply is practically infinite, they are not accepted as money. On the contrary, gold is a simple product in the sense that it carries no counterparty risk and has no underlying obligation or collateral, but it is scarce, hence it is closer to moneyness. In this example, what differentiates gold from a grain of sand is not its informational structure, but its scarcity. For bitcoin, a first hurdle to becoming money or quasi-money is its total lack of any intrinsic value. As the native token of the Bitcoin Blockchain, bitcoin's value is tied to the security of its Blockchain and is partly a result of the trust that its users assign to that security and the fixed number of bitcoins that, by design of its Blockchain, can be issued. Therefore, as of today, bitcoin is being mainly held for speculative purposes.
Money, bitcoin and a crisis of identity
Yet since bitcoin is an evolving phenomenon, it is likely that through time and with emergent upgrades to the bitcoin protocol, such as scaling solutions (e.g., segregated witness or Segwit), second-layer solutions such as Lightning Network, 42 and proposals for redefining the default standard for measuring bitcoin, such as Bits denomination BIP, 43 it could evolve into a reliable store of value and possibly a medium of exchange.
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However, the most difficult hurdle for bitcoin to pass will remain becoming a generally accepted unit of account. There is a hierarchy among the functions of money. For an asset to become a medium of exchange, it needs to be a store of value. And to become a unit of account, such an asset should be used as a medium of exchange across a variety of transactions in a given society so that it could become a means of social coordination. 45 Indeed, for some economists, money's function as the unit of account is the most important criterion in the definition of money. 46 In this perspective, it is far easier for bitcoin to become a store of value or a medium of exchange, however, bitcoin may never become a unit of account due to its inflexible supply schedule that begets price volatility. In theory, the community of users could expand to a size where From a legal perspective, cryptocurrencies should also be differentiated from electronic money (e-money).
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E-money is always at par with fiat money. The main difference between e-money and fiat money is that emoney is the digital representation of fiat money stored on an electronic chip. 57 However, cryptocurrencies are self-anchored and are not pegged to any currency. 58 In addition, e-money issuers should redeem the monetary value of the e-money at par on demand, whereas such an obligation does not exist for cryptocurrency developers or issuers.
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The anonymous attribute in the customer identification section of the above table may not be accurate. As bitcoin transactions are mainly pseudonymous.
In our view, apart from being a commodity money, at least three main properties of bitcoin set it apart from traditional central bank money: decentralization, consensus mechanism, and censorship resistance. Bitcoin has created an incentive-compatible ecosystem for the security and maintenance of the Bitcoin Blockchain OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7-17. 58 Though they can be pegged to fiat currencies (e.g., USDT) 59 Art. L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7-17. leading to the creation of a denationalized and decentralized money. In this view, the idea of central bank cryptocurrency (CBCC), 60 put forward by, among others, 61 Bech and Grarratt of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 62 which retains the issuance of money under the control of the central bank, but decentralizes the settlement method (peer-to-peer settlement) would seem as an oxymoron. 63 This paper, also does not view such cryptocurrencies as true cryptocurrencies; they may best be classified as (centralized) digital base money with a peer-to-peer settlement mechanism.
Alongside bitcoin, the cryptocurrency ecosystem includes a whole variety of other so-called cryptoassets.
According to one classification, assets created using cryptography could fall under the umbrella term of cryptoassets. 64 However, cryptoassets suffer from a crisis of identity. 65 This is mainly because they differ widely from one another, 66 and many tokens or cryptocurrencies listed in cryptocurrency exchanges may not meet even the minimum required criteria of moneyness. On the contrary, upon a closer scrutiny, a majority of digital tokens issued through ICOs can easily meet the definition of an investment contract (security), such as the tokens issued by the DAO.
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Cryptoassets could be classified as digital commodities (cryptocommodities) representing raw digital resources, or digital tokens (cryptotokens) representing finished digital goods and services. 68 Some of these assets can potentially become a new asset class with potential of maturing into a valuable portfolio diversification instrument. 69 This paper focuses on bitcoin, which is the most well-known and the largest cryptocurrency in terms of market cap. Although bitcoin has been designated as a commodity, it has a hybrid nature, displaying the features of both commodities and currencies. Perhaps as of this writing, bitcoin might best be seen as a form of digital commodity money, or in Selgin's words 'synthetic commodity money'. 70 Despite the focus on bitcoin, the analysis of this paper would apply, with varying degrees, to many other cryptocurrencies such as Litecoin (LTC), Dash (DASH), Ripple (XRP), Monero (XMR), and Zcash (ZEC), which exhibit features that are considerably closer to currencies or commodities than investment contracts (securities).
It is important to note that the remainder of this paper has a very specific focus. It is an attempt to apply the lessons from the information economics within the safe asset debate in the shadow banking sector to the emerging world of cryptocurrencies. It is important to acknowledge that although better informational features are helpful and perhaps necessary for an asset that has no intrinsic value to become money, as previously mentioned, it takes more than transparency in information economics for an asset to become a safe asset, money or currency. Therefore, this paper is not and should not be considered as a full treatment of cryptocurrencies and their potential to become money or currency.
Information economics: how bitcoin differs from fiat currency
According to Perry Mehrling, under the gold standard covering mainly the 19 th century, gold (the ultimate international means of payment), national currencies (promises to pay gold), bank deposits (promises to pay currency on demand), and securities (promises to pay currency or deposits during a certain period of time in the future) used to constitute the hierarchy of money; with gold being at the apex of the hierarchy and securities at the bottom. In the fiat money framework, the concept of hierarchy of money can be reconfigured based on the 'safety'
or 'information insensitivity' of a financial instrument. In other words, another way to construct a concept of hierarchy in the fiat currency system is to build this concept based on the information economics of a particular financial instrument or asset. The most information-insensitive (the safest) assets being at the top of the hierarchy of money, the least information-insensitive (the riskiest) assets lying at the bottom.
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Therefore, within this framework, the level of safety of an asset as a means of settlement would be the benchmark against which the concept of hierarchy is built; the source of safety being the money claims' proximity to the government; i.e., the ultimate source of official liquidity and credit puts that make money claims information insensitive.
One essential difference between cryptocurrencies and fiat money is that the latter is invariably the liability of someone, which has to be redeemed by the issuing entity. However, such a promise would not be considered as a binding legal contract as the central bank has theoretically unlimited discretion on inflating the currency. Some theories, such as the credit theory of money, suggest that there is no need for redeemability or convertibility. For example, Mitchell Innes casts significant doubt on whether redeemability has been a feature of currency even under the metallic standard. -M1 is the sum of currency in circulation and overnight deposits; -M2 is the sum of M1, deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years and deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months; and is the liability of someone; mainly governments and banks. But bitcoin, similar to a commodity money, is the liability of no one.
Whilst initially government-issued money had to be redeemed in gold or silver, 75 after decoupling money from the precious metals, the 'full faith and credit' of governments replaced the convertibility of the money to gold or silver. Aside from granting legal tender status to fiat money, the power of the state to impose taxes in the future, which itself depends upon the GDP growth, is mainly what backs fiat money. In addition, the fact that fiat money is accepted by the government for tax purposes ensures that such a currency is good for the discharge of debt (and hence a store of value for future debt repayments), which ultimately facilitated the universal adoption of fiat money (medium of exchange).
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In analyzing bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, the state theory of money, which presupposes that for an asset to become money, it needs to be given the status of legal tender, has limited application as bitcoin has not been granted such a status in any major jurisdiction. Therefore, for the sole purpose of the argument and following the spontaneous or emergent theory of money, we argue that for an asset to become a store of value and a potential medium of exchange, at a minimum, it needs to possess certain safety features. In other words, for something to become a non-state or denationalized money, it needs to first be, or perceived to be, a 'safe asset'. The safe-asset property of a currency can pave the way for its universal adoption, especially at its start-up phase. We will explain then how safety enhancing features of assets (money and quasi-money) in financial and monetary systems have been at work for decades and will show why bitcoin cannot rely on the safety features of traditional currencies. Yet, we will also argue that from an informationeconomics perspective, bitcoin presents certain safety features, which originate from the symmetric knowledge of economic agents or users as to its protocol and the inner workings of its underlying blockchain.
Information asymmetry, adverse selection and money as a medium of exchange
In the context of non-commodity money (e.g. fiat currency), A is willing to accept a piece of paper as a method of payment in anticipation that B will accept it from A, and C will accept it from A and B, ad infinitum. For this to happen, the settlement asset should not give rise to any adverse selection problem arising from the information asymmetry as to the value of the settlement asset. In other words, the asset should be perceived as 'safe' and its safety should be common knowledge. By definition, a safe asset is an information-insensitive asset, 77 holding the promise of becoming a high-quality store of value, a medium of exchange and potentially a unit of account. In other words, in order for a financial instrument to become a store of value and a medium of exchange, it should be highly information-insensitive. This attribute of safe assets could contribute to its price stability in the long run. 78 The analogy to bitcoin could be made as to the underlying design of the Bitcoin Blockchain. Unlike fiat money, bitcoin as a commodity money, is self-anchored and its value is not pegged to any other commodity or contract. However, the trust in bitcoin, especially as a store of value, comes from the fact that it is based on the embedded rules or algorithms governing the Bitcoin Blockchain, that it is decentralized and that its monetary policy should be decided by a specific consensus mechanism. In addition, artificial scarcity in this 'digital' currency plays an important role in the moneyness of bitcoin. Therefore, the value of bitcoin largely originates from holding a digital unit of a means of a store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account on the Bitcoin Blockchain as a secure, decentralized (and intermediary-free), censorship-resistant network for digital payments. In this sense, the value of bitcoin deriving from the trust in the Bitcoin Blockchain would very much resemble the arguments put forward by the institutional theory of money which states that money is "no more than credit against an obligor, whose acceptance as a store of value and as a means of payment by the public is dependent on a comprehensive legal framework that ensures stable purchasing power, its availability even in time of banking stress and its functional capability to settle monetary obligations. It is no longer a chattel, but a transferable credit within an overall institutional framework. To summarize, for an asset to become a medium of exchange, the first and utmost important factor is the safety feature that could enhance its stability in the long run. In transactional terms, the less an asset is prone to adverse selection, the better it is for transactional purposes (i.e., medium of exchange). There are different methods to mitigate adverse selection. Since adverse selection exists because of information asymmetry, signaling and screening have traditionally been two main mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry.
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Another major way of addressing adverse selection problem is to essentially do away with information asymmetry by either shedding sunlight on the settlement asset so that its value would be symmetrically and 83 This difference in economics of information in the equity markets versus debt markets projects itself in the organization and structure of these two markets. Stocks markets are organized to facilitate price discovery, money markets are organized to enhance liquidity. And to do so, they must obviate the need for price discovery. perfectly evaluated by both parties to a transaction (i.e., creating common knowledge), or by obfuscating and hiding all the information so that neither party to a transaction could be able or would have incentive to acquire information (i.e., creating symmetric ignorance). Since an ultimate means of settlement needs to be the most information insensitive and completely free from the adverse selection problem, we argue that for such an asset (money), neither signaling nor screening would provide complete information insensitivity. Instead, for such an asset to best perform its function as an ultimate means of settlement, its value and underlying mechanisms should be either common knowledge or should not be known to any financial market participant at all (symmetric ignorance). In money markets, laddered safety is no safety.
The safety feature of an asset can be enhanced either through public/government guarantees or through private mechanisms. 90 Since bitcoin is a decentralized asset, this paper does not suggest increasing the safety of bitcoin as a store of value by relying on government credit or liquidity puts (if ever possible!) as that suggestion would defeat the very purpose of bitcoin in the first place. And since bitcoin is the first digital asset, pegging its price to a basket of physical commodities would be counterproductive and would defeat the purpose for which it is created. In what comes next, we draw analogies between safety-enhancing mechanisms in the current (shadow) banking system 91 and in the end, compare them to the design of the Bitcoin Blockchain.
How banks and shadow banks create money?
Historically banks and shadow banks have been in the money creation business. Bills of exchange were used to be a remedy for the scarcity of money and soon became the money for merchants. In what follows, we study four typical mechanisms used to create money or quasi-money in the banking and shadow banking sector, they include:
1. Insurance or explicit and implicit government credit and liquidity puts; for example, deposit insurance, LOLR, and bailouts;
2. Collateralization (in covered bonds);
Exemptions from bankruptcy laws in repos;
4. Prudential requirements such as capital and liquidity requirements as well as portfolio restrictions for money-claim issuing entities.
Insurance
There are three theories of banking as related to money creation. The 'financial intermediation theory'
suggests that banks do not create money, 99 the 'fractional reserve theory' of banking implies that although banks create money collectively through 'multiple deposit expansion' (the 'money multiplier'), they do not individually create money, and the 'credit creation theory of banking' argues that each individual bank can create credit and money by granting a loan. insurance, there has been almost no serious runs by depositors on the banks of the developed world.
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Indeed, the only way banks can create money is by relying on the government safety nets. Although deposit insurance rests on risk-based contributions of banks to the deposit insurance funds, in the event of systemic risk, there is an implicit government guarantee for such funds (i.e., bailouts). The government itself relies on its fiscal powers (taxing) in bailouts, and its monopoly over issuing central bank money in its LOLR function.
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The problem with insurance is that it often begets moral hazard, i.e., excessive money creation. It is to prevent such excessive money creation using public credit and liquidity puts that several restrictions and conditions are in place for the provision of such measures. One such proposal for imposing further restrictions was the structural or functional separation in the banking industry that was proposed after the Great Depression. The most radical of all these proposals was the narrow banking proposal for a 100% currency-reserve banking, the most vocal proponents of which was Henry Simons. 108 This proposal, along with his advocacy for equity financing versus debt financing, would effectively ensure that no non-banking institution would be able to create quasi-money instruments or money substitutes. In short, the proponents of narrow banks 109 call for reforms that require all deposits of customers of a bank be held at central banks in the form of deposits, which is equivalent to a 100% reserve requirement. This means that the amounts that can be redeemed at par on demand should have a 100% reserve requirement. This proposal was part of the proposals that came to be known as the Chicago Plan in the aftermath of the Great Depression. 110 At the heart of the narrow banking solutions to the banking crises is the separation of banks into two parts: A narrow bank offering deposits, and a mutual fund or investment company in which all the risks of volatility in the market value of assets pass through to the investors.
It is no surprise that such proposals resurfaced again in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) of excess demand for safe assets. 119 A large amount of creation of these assets were conducted using securitization, repos, and extensive use of credit derivatives, replacing government guarantees by implicit or explicit private sector guarantees. 120 However, repo, which, thanks to over-collateralization (i.e., a haircut on the market value of the collateral) and the short maturity, provides an efficient substitute for demand deposits and a means of short-term market funding, stands out. Unlike bank deposits, the repos' safety does not depend on the amount of the contract, therefore, they are suitable for the cash-management needs of institutional investors.
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An analogy of cryptocurrencies with money markets dominated by repos can shed some light on the issue, as the prime driver of repos in the money markets has been the quest for safe assets. To increase the safety of an asset and use it as money, banks resorted to repos to provide short-term (overnight) investment opportunities for investment funds and, in the meantime, create an efficient source of funding and liquidity for themselves. Repos essentially replicated the function of demand deposits, with an additional safety due to its secured nature. In a short period of time, the use of repo for interbank and institutional financing arrangement became so popular that it effectively became the "oil in the engine of the global banking network" 122 and a substitute for bank deposits for institutional investors. 123 One important aspect of enhancing safety feature of repos lies in the repo's preferential treatment in bankruptcy.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code affords special treatment to Qualified Financial Contracts (QFCs) (including derivatives and repos) by exempting them from the 'automatic stay' and allowing counterparties to terminate these contracts (by closing out, netting or setting off their derivatives positions) and to seize the underlying collateral. 124 The equivalent of such preferential treatment is also adopted in Europe as part of In general, removing the automatic stay exception would act as a curb on repos by reducing the liquidity of the collateral, particularly in tri-party markets. 128 This can be viewed as a sensible regulatory measure to reduce the reliance on lower-quality collateral, akin to setting minimum haircuts. However, removing this exception would probably be unwarranted for higher-quality collateral, such as most governmentguaranteed securities. 129 As the most important impact of such bankruptcy safe harbors for repo collateral is that they enhanced the safety of repo to be used in (interbank) financial transactions as money, removing such exemptions for lower quality collateral would erode the moneyness of repos and place a curb on (quasi)money creation by shadow banks.
Microprudential regulation: Portfolio restrictions, leverage and liquidity requirements
Money Market Funds (MMFs) are financial intermediaries that connect short-term debt issuers with providers of funds who need daily liquidity. 130 Currently, CNAV MMFs are effective substitutes for insured deposits, and provide continuous liquidity for those institutional investors that have surplus funds and need daily liquidity. Since claims on MMFs are virtually redeemable at par on demand, they are money (M3).
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) have adopted measures on the reform of the MMFs and short-term investment funds (STIFs) to address the risk of run on such entities. 131 SEC's reforms have so far focused on reducing risk on the asset side of MMFs' balance sheet. These reforms require a minimum percentage of assets to be held in highly liquid securities (daily and weekly requirements), they further impose restrictions on the purchase of lower quality securities by MMFs.
In addition, the SEC rules treat government MMFs (that invest at least 80% of their assets in U.S.
government debt) and prime MMFs (that invest in corporate debt) differently. These rules require that government MMFs can maintain stable price per share (CNAV), but the prime MMFs should adopt the Variable Net Asset Value (VNAV) pricing model. To be more precise, according to the SEC's 2014 revisions to the regime governing MMFs, there will be three distinct categories of MMFs: retail (prime/municipal) MMFs, institutional (prime/municipal) MMFs, and government MMFs. Retail (prime/municipal) MMFs will be priced daily, at CNAV of $1.00, and will be available to natural persons only. Institutions, businesses, and other organizations are not eligible to invest in these types of funds. They are required to impose liquidity fees and or redemption gates. Institutional prime/municipal MMFs will be priced daily at VNAV. All categories of investors are eligible to invest in these types of funds. They are required to impose liquidity fees or redemption gates. And government MMFs, which will be priced daily at CNAV, will face no restrictions on eligible investors. These MMFs can impose redemption or liquidity fees and/or they can suspend all fund redemptions (aka redemption gates).
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Similar measures were put in place in 2017 in Europe. 133 The EU MMF Regulation recognizes three types of MMFs. VNAV MMFs, public debt CNAV MMFs and Low volatility NAV MMFs (LVNAV MMFs).
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This regulation imposes certain levels of daily/weekly liquidity (portfolio rules) on both short-term MMFs 135 and standard MMFs. 136 The LNAV and public debt CNAV funds are required to hold at least 10% of their assets in instruments that mature on a daily basis 137 and an additional 30% of their assets maturing in a week. 138 These liquidity requirements are imposed to ensure that investor redemption could be satisfied in a timely fashion. As it is clear, the main reason behind these new regulatory developments has been to limit 'private' quasi-money creation by MMFs, while allowing such quasi-money creation for funds L 169, 30.6.2017, p. 8-45 investing in government bonds. In effect, this suggests that the ultimate source of safety of such privatelycreated quasi money is the government.
Collateralization
An additional private innovation, which has played a major role in enhancing the safety of assets, is collateralization, which has reached its zenith in the production of covered bonds. Covered bonds are bonds (debt securities) secured by high-quality collateral. In addition to the over-collateralized cover pool, investors in covered bonds have an unsecured recourse against the issuer in the event of collateral deficiency (dual recourse). Cover-pool assets, which are ring-fenced to protect investors in the event of the bankruptcy of the issuer (bankruptcy remoteness of the cover pool), remain on the balance sheet of the issuer.
Furthermore, the weak assets in the cover pool are constantly replaced by high-quality assets throughout the life of the bond (dynamic cover-pool). 139 In addition to all of the above features, bankruptcy laws and regulations such as the BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) Regulation exempt covered bonds from its bail-in provisions, which essentially constitutes a regulatory subsidy for covered bonds.
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All these features make covered bonds a high-yielding and attractive alternative to government securities.
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Covered bonds are not different from securitization in essence, in the sense that they are trying to create safe assets using private sources of safety. Such funds, if sufficiently information insensitive, can play the role of money in the financial markets by becoming a safe collateral against which borrowing would be made possible.
All in all, shares or bonds in money market funds, repos and to a lesser degree covered bonds can be viewed as quasi-money. All of the above mechanisms for money creation rely on a set of complex instruments enhancing information insensitivity of money created by banks and shadow banks. However, all of the above sources of safety and money and quasi-money creation mechanisms share a common feature in that they are directly or indirectly linked to governments as the ultimate credit and liquidity put providers.
To summarize, the shadow banking sector engages in money creation by turning information-sensitive assets into information-insensitive ones by deploying insurance, collateralization, prudential regulation, and preferential regulatory treatment in bankruptcy. As it is clear by now, money creation in shadow banking has mainly been a public-private endeavor. As we sketched the main mechanisms of the public-private money creation in the banking and shadow banking sector, now it is time to ask what creates safety or information insensitivity for central bank money, which is considered to be the safest asset in the financial system and the ultimate means of settlement in payment and settlement systems.
Information asymmetry and central bank money
Ideally, to become a 'safe asset' and to play a role as a medium of exchange, a debt instrument should be above suspicion and beyond doubt as to the value of the underlying collateral. However, no debt instrument Further studies also confirm that at least at its inception, obviating the incentive for information acquisition through creating symmetric ignorance played a key role in shaping central bank money. Schnabel and Shin (2018) discuss the evolution of trust in central banking in the context of the Kipper-und Wipperzeit (the clipping and culling times) crisis in the early 1600s in Germany, where due to clipping and debasement of coins, which resulted in the uncertainty about the true value of coins, trade was brought into a standstill.
They show how the evolution of public deposit banks (precursors to modern central banks) helped subdue the crisis by the standardization of the wholesale payments through replacing cash settlement by settlement through bank deposits (cashless payment system). They concede that "[e]ven if the coins backing the deposits were of uncertain quality, such uncertainty affects all account holders equally and symmetrically.
The fundamentals would be uncertain, but the uncertainty is common knowledge." 143 Instead of using the term 'symmetric ignorance', the authors dub the knowledge of uncertainty 'common knowledge', as is often used in economics and finance literature. However, the better terminology for this common knowledge of ignorance or uncertainty would be 'symmetric ignorance' as used throughout this paper.
Therefore, in contrast to the view that holds that the common knowledge in transactions has been provided by central banks or their predecessors (reducing or removing adverse selection problem), 144 in fact, early banking institutions and governments have chosen a certain degree of obscurity and obfuscation to remove the incentives for people to acquire information about the true value of money and its underlying collateral.
Indeed, a level of symmetric ignorance is necessary in order for the people to accept a debt instrument as a medium of exchange or a store of value. This symmetric ignorance removes all the incentives to acquire information about the underlying collateral. The price tag of relying on symmetric ignorance
The safety feature arising from a secured debt contract comes with a price tag. A shock to the value of the underlying collateral that would cause an information-insensitive debt to become information sensitive can have a disruptive impact and unleash a full-fledged financial crisis. 148 Such a shock would either provoke information acquisition, leading to adverse selection, and resulting in the likely collapse of the market for debt, or it would provoke no incentive for information acquisition. In the latter case, instead of information acquisition, market participant would only be willing to trade at a price lower than the fundamental value of the debt instruments, which again would lead to write-downs and fire sales. Both scenarios are likely to result in financial crises.
149
Compared to equity markets, money claimants respond differently from equity claimants to new information. Unlike equity markets where equity prices respond to new information in an incremental fashion, money markets often respond to new information non-linearly and in a precipitous manner. 150 In other words, new information can lead to a collapse of trade in debt funding markets and can be a discontinuous event, 151 creating a cliff-effect. This is perhaps why financial crises often involved debt markets. This has been documented in the GFC in the run on repos backed by structured securities (private money à la Pozsar). 152 In the repo markets, due to lower appetite for liquidity and credit risks, triparty repo investors (mainly MMFs) often pre-emptively withdraw funding at an early stage. 153 This feature of noncentral bank money -also called -institutional money, gives it a special attribute: Debt-based money becomes a binary, either-or phenomenon.
However, it is hard to extend this argument to central bank money, and especially to those central banks with credible track record, such as the ECB, the Federal Reserve or the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The information insensitivity of money issued by such central banks relies on a longstanding trust in the institutions and the political context within which they were born and evolved. The information-economics perspective of non-central bank fiat money and debt contracts offers therefore only a limited insight on the safety features of such central bank money. This holds less true however for such currencies that continue to be subject to wild fluctuations, such as Venezuelan Bolívar, Russian Ruble, Turkish Lira, Iranian Rial, and Argentinian Peso, as well as the extreme cases of Zimbabwean Dollar and Ecuadorian Sucre, which led to dollarization in the latter two countries. The binary nature of fiat money from the information economics approach could well be applicable to such currencies.
Bitcoin as an evolving digital commodity money
Most cryptocurrencies, especially bitcoin, are more akin to commodity money. Compared to debt instruments, a commodity has even a bumpier road to becoming money. Unlike fiat money, whose value depends on the full faith and credit of governments, to be viable, a commodity money, as a self-anchored money, needs to build consensus among its users that it is, or is perceived to be, a viable store of value or a medium of exchange in a coordination game. 154 And arriving at such a consensus can take centuries or more, as was the case with gold or silver.
In the absence of a credible obligor (i.e., a central authority, underwriter, or debtor), building consensus around a commodity money would require it to display certain properties to assure the users that the commodity money possesses certain intrinsic value or safety features in terms of information insensitivity so that it could get off the ground. In the absence of intrinsic value or any other stabilizing mechanism, such as pegging the value of the money to the price of a basket of commodities, the value (if any) of commodity money is prone to wild fluctuations. 155 In case of bitcoin, this may be due to the increased information sensitivity coming from the user sentiment and fluctuations in the network value of the coin or even potential security vulnerabilities. Such levels of information sensitivity would be a major obstacle in the path to becoming an effective store of value, a viable medium of exchange, or a potential unit of account.
Without a mechanism to ensure stability, a run would easily occur upon a discovery of additional information as of the value of a commodity money. In case of bitcoin, its transparency, digital nature and its global reach have helped it gain momentum and become a consensus-based store of value and medium of exchange within the bitcoin community in a relatively short time span. However, to become a long-term store of value or a widely accepted medium of exchange, bitcoin needs to be information insensitive.
Nonetheless, there is a difference between information insensitivity stemming from exogenous shocks/information and that originating from endogenous shocks. As of this writing, bitcoin has been extremely sensitive to exogenous information or shocks. Even trivial positive information, such as listing in an exchange, has doubled or tripled its price in a relatively short time span. On the other hand, negative information (such as a hack of an exchange) has also had a disproportionate negative impact on its price and increased its volatility by orders of magnitude unheard of in the traditional assets markets. However, seldom could these wild fluctuations be attributable to the endogenous shocks or information about the Bitcoin Blockchain itself; with a few exceptions such as the scalability debate, which occurred in November 2017, that had a rather benign impact on its price.
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The extreme price volatility stemming from exogenous shocks can also be a sign of the youth and immaturity of an asset. And it is not to say that in the future, volatility and information sensitivity of bitcoin cannot be mitigated by market forces. As data suggest, volatility of bitcoin has been decreasing significantly over time. 
Fiat money vs. bitcoin: Symmetric ignorance vs. common knowledge
Does the information economics of debt-based money apply to a digital or synthetic commodity money (i.e., bitcoin)? If history is of any guidance, it suggests that commodity money is also not immune to perils of information economics. As for gold, its price is dependent on its scarcity. News related to the mining and discovery of gold would have a positive or negative impact on the price of gold. This has happened several times in history (e.g., California gold rush). At its extreme, a discovery of a large swath of gold would diminish its value as a store of value and put its moneyness at risk. However, gold itself is a selfanchored simple product and as such its value is not dependent on many endogenous shocks.
It appears that bitcoin has also taken a different path from that of fiat money with regard to its information economics. This path is very similar to that of gold. Although, unlike gold, bitcoin is a complex product, and is laid out in Satoshi's whitepaper. 157 There is a predefined supply schedule, 158 and the open ledger of bitcoin is out in the public eye and everyone with an internet connection has access to all the data and transactions being processed on the Bitcoin Blockchain. Hence, there seems to be no endogenous information with regard to bitcoin the revelation of which could cause a dramatic increase or a collapse in the value of bitcoin. Therefore, bitcoin makes no attempt to hide any information by creating endogenous vagueness. On the contrary, technical transparency is endogenous to bitcoin. 159 By design, the transparency level of bitcoin is so high that it discourages any attempt by agents to acquire private information about the value of bitcoin, making it an adverse-selection proof instrument and a viable instrument to become a medium of exchange.
Since ignorance can be turned into knowledge, but knowledge cannot be reversed back into ignorance, an instrument, which is built on common knowledge, has an advantage against an instrument that is built on symmetric ignorance. Hence, bitcoin enjoys a high level of endogenous information insensitivity. This in turn means that bitcoin does not have to pay the price of symmetric-ignorance-based information insensitivity, i.e., a precipitous run. This gives bitcoin a certain edge compared to fiat money and can potentially transform it into a safe store of value. It appears that this high level of technical transparency in the Bitcoin Blockchain has been the most significant factor contributing to building trust among the early adopters and has paved the way to its incredibly fast adoption. Creating a consensus that something without a physical form has value and can be used as a currency without relying on trusted third parties is by far a success in itself. 160 The digital nature, high level of security based on PoW, properties such as resistance to double spending, forge-proof, tamperproof and immutability, censorship resistance, pseudonymity (and anonymity), cheaper transaction cost, 161 and decentralized, distributed trust feature of bitcoin all contribute in turn to this consensus.
As bitcoin cannot rely on the safety features of fiat money, especially not the trust and institutional backing of central banking, it needs to overcome this inherent weakness by building information insensitivity through fully sharing the information about the technical processes -protocol, blockchain, network and all underlying operational features of the Bitcoin Blockchain -on which it is built. The common knowledge of these technical features stands in contrast to the symmetric ignorance of the inner workings and backing of fiat money. From a pure information-economics perspective, transparency entails a higher level of information insensitivity than symmetric ignorance. This is not to say such technical transparency can make up for the absence of intrinsic value of bitcoin. Yet, it is the strongest feature on which bitcoin can rely on its journey to be recognized as a 'safe asset' or its claim to moneyness.
Despite its informational attributes, it is highly unlikely that bitcoin would be accepted as a single base money within a single currency area due to its inelastic or fixed supply schedule, which removes monetary policy flexibility needed both in times of calm and crises and makes it volatile in the face of demand shocks.
It is also unlikely that bitcoin would be a substitute for commercial bank money, as the latter has its own advantages serving various needs of a given economy. However, bitcoin could become a niche currency even if it will most probably never become a major parallel or concurrent currency exerting substantial competitive pressure on the central bank money. 162 As the development of banking and shadow banking 160 Burniske and Tatar 
Summary and conclusion
Although regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have taken a passive approach to regulating cryptocurrencies, with the increasing popularity and potential success of cryptocurrency experiments, it is likely that governments would involve in regulating cryptocurrencies in the foreseeable future. This paper highlights certain aspects of information economics in cryptocurrency as well as fiat-money ecosystems that could inform future regulatory intervention in the cryptocurrency ecosystem.
The main contribution of this paper lies in the lessons drawn from the literature on shadow banking, safe assets and information economics. Cryptocurrencies are not the first example of non-governmental or private money creation. Even within the current financial system, a large portion of monetary aggregates (including parts of M1, M2, and M3) consists of private or quasi-private money (e.g., bank deposits, claims on government and prime CNAV MMFs, etc.,).
Shadow banking has long been in the business of quasi-money issuance, and safe-asset debate lies at the heart of money creation within the shadow banking system. For an asset to be safe, it needs to be information insensitive. The main techniques used to create information insensitive assets in the banking and shadow banking system have been insurance, (over)collateralization, imposing prudential requirements on the issuing entities, and preferential regulatory treatment of quasi-money instruments (bankruptcy safe harbors for repos). In all these cases, the value of an external element (e.g., collateral in repos, government credit and liquidity puts in deposits) removes the depositors' or investors' incentives to acquire information about the underlying debt contract, making it information insensitive.
Although the safest asset in the financial system (i.e., central bank money) is not a debt contract in its current form, it can be thought of as an implicit or abstract promise. It is the full faith and credit of the relevant government and the credibility of the central bank that remove any incentive for participants to acquire information about the underlying collateral. Obviating the need for information acquisition in this way eventually leads to a state of blissful symmetric ignorance, in the words of Holmstrom.
The information economics and potential information insensitivity of bitcoin relies, on the contrary, on the symmetric (common) knowledge of the underlying inner workings of the Bitcoin Blockchain. The proposition that knowledge can be attained, and ignorance can be turned into knowledge, but knowledge 163 Hal Finney, "Re: Bitcoin Bank," (December 30, 2010) .
cannot be unlearned and reversed back into ignorance is central to the information insensitivity of bitcoin.
Full technical transparency in the Bitcoin Blockchain eliminates incentives to acquire new information, thereby eliminating the adverse-selection problem arising from information asymmetry as to the theoretical value of bitcoin as a medium of exchange. This informational attribute of bitcoin can potentially help transform it into a potential 'safe asset', a store of value, and perhaps a medium of exchange.
As previously mentioned, this paper has a narrow focus and studies bitcoin from a very specific microeconomic (information-economics) perspective with a special focus on the lessons drawn from the safe asset literature within the broader shadow banking literature. Therefore, this study should not, in and of itself, be viewed as a full and comprehensive treatment of safety and potential moneyness of bitcoin.
Further future research needs to be conducted on the potential for bitcoin or similar cryptocurrencies to become a full-fledged safe asset. In addition to a huge future research opportunity on technical specificities such as miner concentration and validation and confirmation processes, special focus should be given to bitcoin's price stability, supply schedule, robust legal framework for payments in cryptocurrencies, concerns about fungibility and immutability and the impact of the rise of cryptocurrencies on central and commercial banking.
Yet, given the potential promises of bitcoin and its properties in terms of its information economics, public policy should allow for the organic and market-driven growth of bitcoin, which is by far one of the most promising experiments in the modern digital-era monetary history. Since the cryptocurrency ecosystem is in its infancy, a hard-touch regulatory approach can hinder the potential welfare-enhancing innovations coming from this ecosystem. However, this suggestion should not be mistaken for an advocacy of regulatory faineance, as the development of the ecosystem suffers from legal uncertainty. To the contrary, this approach is a defense of regulatory sobriety, data dependency, and a deference to the virtues of experimentation, permissionless innovation, spontaneous discovery process 164 and evolutionary dynamics in the financial system. 165
